Regarding the Pentagon Leaked Documents
An assessment & the most important/interesting revelations rather than fluff
Regarding the Pentagon leak and the documents we have seen.
Out of those that have been circulated in the public domain, want to discuss the most important and/or interesting, which are a small minority.
First a note about the leak itself.
In general, the leak seems genuine to me. Cannot be sure, things of this nature can always be intentional misinformation but in this case I doubt it.
Some people have pointed out inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the documents. To me those indicate authentic mediocre quality government work rather than high quality intentional statecraft.
Of all the things pointed out, the strangest to me is just the date references such as "as of 1 Mar" in the headline (below) in document #1.
It would be unnatural for most Americans to write a date in this way. However, American academia sometimes adopts international standards (d/m/y, metric etc), the military and/or security fields may as well. Would be happy to hear if this is or isn't the case. At least it may be in documents like this prepared for general NATO and European consumption.
I also do not think they were intentionally released by Russia. They were likely an organic leak, and Russia likely learned about them at about the same time than the US government (maybe a little earlier due to their circulation in pro-Russian Discord & Telegram channels). I also believe that Russia truly believes, as it has stated, that they are intentional disinformation. Especially since they did not obtain or release the documents.
Russians tend to have a predilection to believe in conspiracy. When speaking with eastern Europeans in general, you will find that it is often very difficult for them to believe in the every day incompetence, mediocracy & statistical realities that explain much of what happens in our world. This is a common trait in many people in general, but I find it much more pronounced and frequent in the east vs the west (an interesting topic in itself for another time).
Despite the opinion that they are generally authentic, this does not apply to every document and every pixel. Some likely have been altered, and various versions are going around.
The best example (also in doc #1) revolves around estimated Russian and Ukrainian KIA losses.
Some versions show very low RU losses, and others the reverse, with only 16-17.5k KIA for Ukraine.
The most natural explanation is that once these documents made their way to the pro-Russian channels, folks there altered what they didn't like. The majority of the information on the documents is embarrassing for the US & for Ukraine. But some would be for Russia, so keeping the majority & doing some cosmetic changes would be the answer.
The problem with that theory is that the date stamps for the known files are in reverse order, at least what I could find. The doc with greater Russian losses seems to have circulated after the one with the lower figure. So unclear what happened there.
What I can say is this, in the most likely scenario, where the US is estimating KIA losses as 17k for UA and 35-43k KIA for Russia, the implication is incompetence. It indicates an over eagerness to believe Ukrainian (obviously biased) reporting & the reverse for Russian reporting (at least public reporting).
It is evidence of the US being strung along by Ukraine, or at least the US and UA cooperating in stringing along their underlings. The KIA numbers and their ratios are almost certainly very inaccurate (in either version of the document).
Though we should note that this may not be the case at higher levels, but what we see only in these documents that seem to be meant for a pretty wide audience.
To me, they seem like a slightly lower quality and lower level of secrecy than what we as combat soldiers would regularly see in the IDF. The documents do not look like something that is meant for a very limited number of folks with very high clearance (and if it is, the US and its allies are in worse shape than we fear). It is the kind of thing we would see during an intel briefing where we are all asked to leave our cell phones outside (which goes well together with the fact that these are not digital or scanned docs, but images of physical documents). In reality security is fairly lax for these and the intended viewing audience is large. Everyone simply knows and is reminded to not repeat anything on the outside. This may indicate that the leaker is not a producer or distributor of these materials (such as someone high in an intel position) but simply someone cleared to see physical copies in general or at certain times (which could be as low level as a combat soldier or junior officer).
These documents look like a slightly more realistic version of the complete surreal fantasy one would see in CNN & mainstream media. And thus I imagine it would be meant for middle management at the highest. They are very broad in nature and do not come close to indicating details of future plans, outside of what is already broadly known in thinking circles (not in CNN).
Will add that earlier today saw a story by the @washingtonpost (https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/12/discord-leaked-documents/)
that was quite illuminating on the matter. It did not in any way change what I wanted to write here (for the last few days but haven’t had the time until now) but it seems to me that they are on to the right group.
All seems believable, and it is not surprising that they got to these 2 particular young group members before any Feds did so, despite the priority of their investigation, having access to the real documents, the identities of all people with access to them, and the ability to quickly force companies like Discord & Telegram to quickly cooperate with them (did like that Elon Musk resisted caving to the Biden admin days ago when they requested these be "erased from the internet").
In any event, having given this background about the leaks, this is what I found interesting.
#1. By far the most important is document #2
We have speculated for a long while now that UA's AA capability was being degraded and noted that the RU air force was operating increasingly deeper along the front.
For a long time we have discussed the gradual long term trend, such as here in early 2022:
https://twitter.com/ZimermanErik/status/1510928304467021826
and late 2022:
https://twitter.com/ZimermanErik/status/1587845654549757952
Here we discussed the reported original 100 SA-300 systems UA counted on (
https://twitter.com/ZimermanErik/status/1620979179138449408)
Here we see US assessment that there were only 28 SA-300 on hand (& 57 shorter range SA-11). Additionally, the missiles for the S-300 will run out by the beginning of May & yesterday (or 2 weeks ago) for the SA-11s protecting the front line troops.
The older SA-8s are then the only AA in significant numbers at that point & that ammo runs out in June, without counting the increased firing rate as others run out. The SA-8 is low altitude, short range, and old. Though highly mobile, on its own the RU aerospace forces have the opportunity to wipe it out.
The document shows the current (early Feb), already strained state of the AD picture, and then estimates a virtually non-existent AD situation for Ukraine by May 2023.
The suggested mitigating course of actions the document suggests are vague, of doubtful effectiveness, and non-committal.
An accompanying document (below) highlights the emptiness of the above suggestions. There doesn’t seem to be any significant SA numbers (neither systems nor missiles) to speak of incoming from allies. What is left is to wait for western AD systems which are a long way out. Implementing them once air superiority has been lost will be much harder than the already difficult proposition of fast implementation by a struggling army devoid of experience with the western systems during wartime, and over a vast country under attack from the air continuously and by all types of weapons.
There just isn’t much for quite a long window, even by these optimistic estimates.
In fact, the document’s “BLUF” sums it up well:
Current UKR Air Defense (AD) plan balances limited resources to protect critical national infrastructure (CNI), population centers, front line of troops (FLOT), and other key assets across Ukraine. UKRs ability to provide medium range air defense to protect the FLOT will be completely reduced by May 23 [2023]. UKR assessed to withstand 2-3 more wave strikes. As 1t Layer Defense munitions run out, 2nd and 3rd Layer expenditure rates will increase, reducing the ability to defend against Russian aerial attacks from all altitudes.
The implications
The importance of this document cannot be overestimated. Relative to majority of the material in the rest of the documents, bland, broad, vague and mostly already suspected, this is very detailed and very concerning for Kiev and its allies. Russia has recently diminished the rate of large scale missile strikes (though it has increased its use of adapted guided bombs that are having a devastating effect against front line troops).
The wave of expensive ballistic missiles were destroying Ukraine’s infrastructure, and its training and logistics capabilities. Perhaps more important than all that is that they were diminishing its AD systems. The Russians were sending hundreds of “decoy” (cheaper) missiles to waste more expensive UA AD missiles in a true game of attrition, will and staying power. As I have noted before, it is much reminiscent of Churchill’s later admission that the only thing that really worried him during the war were the cold mathematical realities and statistics revolving around the Battle for the Atlantic waged by the German U-boats. The battle was one of tonnage (sunk and produced), graphs and extrapolations where the numbers were inched up or down for either side by the courage and ingenuity of the man risking their lives on the high seas as well as beneath their waves.
Of course, this longer term war is now one of attrition, of production, training, rotations, economics and as always, will. The will to do all of those and to fight on regardless of outcomes that are always different than expectations. Planning, executing and delivering on all these longer term goals, while keeping in mind how the enemy will perform in these same, are the nuts and bolts of the endeavor.
In any event, Russia must be viewing this document with great temptation. Russian command was undoubtedly aware of the degradation of Ukrainian AD but they most likely not to this extent nor certainty. They are also aware of their own force’s losses and degradation (as well as future production/training expectations). Seeing this makes tempting the thought that if they push now, with everything they have as far as ballistic missiles, guided bombs, and aerial (bombers, fighters and drones) assets, they can rapidly finish degrading Ukrainian AD systems and finally achieve the complete (or at least near complete at certain altitudes) air superiority. First over the front, and increasingly everywhere throughout the country.
Once air superiority is lost in an area, let alone a whole country, it is much more difficult to re-establish. That is because all activity, including movement of assets, building, repairing, concentration of forces/systems, is open to attack from the air. Attempting to set up piecemeal AD systems will lead to their destruction piecemeal. Re-establishing AD capability would require using European territory (ie Poland) as a No-Fly Zone.
AD systems (even if nominally under UA command) would have to fire first from Poland for example to create an anti-air umbrella over the border, which could be used to move further assets into Ukraine once again. This protected zone would have to painfully and gradually “creep” forward, pushing Russian air forces back. It would be very complex, difficult, and require the enemy’s cooperation in at least not coming up with any way to stop it. Expanding east of the Dnieper would be especially difficult once air superiority had been exerted over it (including its bridges). Not to mention that all of this would be politically a huge escalation (firing from outside Ukraine). But just like it would be very difficult to come back from that, it would be very difficult for Russia to achieve it as well.
So taking a step back, we can assume that Russia could see this at least as a very good opportunity to establish air superiority over the front lines if not large parts of eastern Ukraine. Once air superiority is achieved, Russia can utilize them to finally engage in ground offensives with full air-support and air superiority, something so far only a dream for both sides in this conflict. If this speeds up the gains on the ground, air superiority over the very large country would not be needed. The air superiority could move west with the front for a very long ways before this would become difficult. Likely until the end of the war (or at least this round).
In fact this document tells information so critical, that it would make Russia doubt its truthfulness. Because it undoubtedly is struggling with its own capacity and economic forecasts (missiles, bombs, planes, tanks etc that can be produced per month), Russia could believe that the document is an invitation to expend its last ballistic missiles and risk its remaining air force in an all out attempt to wipe out what is left of Ukraine’s AD systems. Basically the documents could be setting up an ambush for Russia’ air force.
The Ambush. Three factors would give this some credence.
First, Russia recently slowed its ballistic missile attacks. It also started using guided bombs very successfully. UA AD systems cannot stop them and they are wrecking having along the front. They are cheap to produce and are being made by upgrading “dumb” bombs in Russia’s massive existing stock. They are also being improved with gained experience in terms of accuracy and range. Russian command could believe that this switch is so successful, that the US would like to “trick” Russia into once again using its very expensive ballistic missiles, perhaps depleting its stock and resources (while the West can always afford more anti-air missiles). This would leave Ukraine’s hinterland out of range and free to build up, while open up Russia’s interior to ballistic missile attack (that can be provided by the West).
If it is a trap and Russia’s risks its drones and jet fighters over UA territory in a bid to finish off the last of the AD defense, the air power will be almost impossible to rebuild. It would allow UA to gradually build up air power with Western support and eventually even gain its own air superiority over the front (though that prospect is difficult and far off).
Secondly is the very nature of the plans and projections. After more than 1 year of close cooperation with the US, NATO and her allies, as Ukraine’s AD stocks gradually dwindle, would there not be a better plan? How could a secret document at this late stage of the game, simply show such an open window of opportunity for Russia? How could it simply indicate that Ukraine will shortly be left virtually defenseless in terms of air attack? This alone would be very suspicious.
Thirdly is the level of detail of the two documents related to Air Defense. While the rest of the documents are very low level and rarely have information more specific than is seen online by OSINT writers and investigators, why are these two documents so detailed? Why do they contain exact number of Air defense missiles, and their exact expenditure rates, as well as expected (basically non existent) replenishment?
(On the other hand, none of the above surprises me at all)
To the Russian high command, these details combined with the fact that the documents were leaked at all, will create suspicion that they are fake (as Russia has already announced). However, after more careful thought and investigation, I think they will come to the conclusion that they at least may be real and probing the possibilities that it shows.
Spring Offensive Delayed
Finally we have the announcement of the long awaited Ukrainian Spring Offensive, until summer at the earliest, as was indicated by the Prime Minister. This came on the footsteps of the leaked documents. But it also came after heavy shelling and strikes in the rear areas of Zaporizhzhia where the offensive was expected (and had very little chance of success). Russia reported two HIMARS systems destroyed along with munitions and other artillery systems. Troop concentrations in the rear have also been hit in recent hours and days.
It is possible that the Ukrainians were rushing to launch the offensive in large part because they wanted to do so while they still enjoyed significant AA umbrella. If what the document says is true, launching it in summer without any AD systems active would make no sense. Now that the cat was out of the bag, and angry at the Americans for causing it, they decided to delay until ready, which will include western anti-air assets.
But it is also possible that they simply saw the leak as a good excuse to announce a delay, because they are no position to advance in Zaporizhzhia, especially after the heavy strikes, but the Western “partners” were demanding success on the front. Of course it is also possible that the offensive is not really delayed and this was a shallow ruse. If the offensive succeeds, they will look very clever, and if there is no advance… well of course not since there is no real offensive until summer. These were just DRG “probing actions”. Something like the latter is the most likely.
Separately (and in a bit of a digression) I doubt that the Ukrainians at this point believe an advance in Zaporizhzhia towards Melitopol is possible (though I can’t say their high command learns fast so who knows?). The terrain is flat and open (favors Russia) and has now been heavily fortified for over a year. It is also well manned, well supplied and in depth. The western tanks it is receiving would do much better in the long Kreminna / Svotove / Kupyansk front which is more thinly manned and much less fortified. This is the type of area (and in fact the same area) where Ukraine did well in the past. Folks expect the tanks to be used where its flatter and more open in the south, and the entire horse and pony show about an offensive there may be in effort to hide one in the north (or elsewhere).
The key questions are weather the documents show the true state of Ukrainian AD, and the true lack of a Western plan to fix them. If so, will the fact that this was revealed to the public cause it to change and will it speed up Western deliveries of AD systems? Knowing this risk, will Russia develop and execute a plan in the near term to finish off what is left of UA’s air defenses? Or will it think all of this is too likely an ambush and proceed slowly and methodically?
Second Subject
Document #3
This leaves us with one more document I found quite interesting (but much less surprising). Now updating with commentary on this third document.
Israel is one of the few Western nations not to have reflexively jumped on the anti Russia bandwagon early in the war. It did not formally sanction Russia (though in reality trade, payments and other activities with Russia are currently limited or not possible at all), and did not provide military aid to Ukraine. This stance being gradually bent towards Ukraine by the previous (and worthless) government under the influence of the endlessly ignorant Lapid.
With Netanyahu back in power, a pro-Ukrainian shift is even more remote, but apparently the change in government is seen as an opportunity to effect a change in policy by the Pentagon and Biden administration.
As US and especially European military stocks dwindle, Israel and its arms industry become an increasingly tempting target for the White House to pressure into arming Kiev. Due to the lack of conventional wars vs peer or near pear opponents in many decades, and the downsizing of the militaries of many European and western states, the western arms industry has adapted to its market. It produces advanced, very expensive weapons in small numbers.
It has become adapt at maneuvering red tape, complex internal wars of funding, bidding, lobbying and government contracts. Its products can pass a myriad of certifications, field tests and bureaucracy, and carry the price tag to prove it. High margins and high profits are required to justify the long sale, design, approval and production cycles as well as the small numbers that are ultimately needed and sold.
So while Western industry has a massive potential and capability for ramping up production, this would require very significant investment for additional production lines. It also would require changes in many aspects of operations and government cooperation for it (easing red tape).
For example, the Javelin Joint Venture between Raytheon and Lockheed Martin has produced around 12,000 Javelin anti-tank systems ever, and 50,000 missiles. Lockheed Martin has said it can produce around 2,000 missiles per year (and working on doubling that capacity). By early last year (2022), the US alone had already sent Ukraine 5,500 Javelins, a third of its stock and more than 10% of those ever produced. The figure stood at 7,000 a month or two later (who knows how many by now). The situation with Stinger missiles is even worse.
So the only way that Ukraine was able to get such large stocks of weapons early in the war was because the US and European nations were using “drawdowns” of their own military’s stocks. Those are largely depleted beyond what governments are willing to continue to send Ukraine. Ukraine is now increasingly dependent on new production.
With all this in mind, we can see how Israel’s IDF is an attractive target for requiring stocks. Neither the IDF nor Israel’s private industry has depleted its current stocks. They also count on significant production capacity.
It is should not be surprising given what the documents tell us about the state of the Ukrainian AD systems, that the two out of the three weapon systems highlighted as “Select Israel-Origin Weapons that could be transferred to Ukraine” are anti-air defense systems.
The Barak 8 is an advanced SAM. The naval version recently shot down two Hezbollah UAVs flying over Karish gas fields in the Mediterranean. The Spyder SAM is a very efficient low-level short range ant-air system. Together the Pentagon may think they would replace the SA-10 and SA-12 systems that are fast being depleted in Ukraine.
The third weapon listed, the Spike ATGM is (as the document note) an Israeli Javelin equivalent. Important as short term demand for western anti-tank systems is beyond production rates.
So how does the US propose to change PM Netanyahu’s mind, and make him send lethal equipment to Ukraine?
Three proposals “scenarios” are considered.
Have Israel, under US pressure, adopt the “Turkish model”. Turkey has maintained ties with Russia despite indirectly selling arms to Ukraine.
Why this is likely false and a poor analogy?
Turkey currently has massive leverage over Russia due to its control of Bosporus and access to and out of the Black Sea. Turkey can stop foreign Navies from entering the Black Sea (as it has thus far) and can allow or prohibit Russian naval forces to operate in the Mediterranean (which it has thus far). Additionally, crucial maritime trade from the black sea including grain exports must pass through the straight as well.
Under normal circumstances, Turkey would know better than to attempt to cut off Russian access to the Mediterranean, and if it did Russia would know how to deal with that, but in the midst of this war Russia can afford no additional foes. Turkey is also heavily involved in Syria and in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, as is Russia, additional points of leverage for Turkey.
Finally, Turkey and Iran are both very antagonistic to Israel. Keeping close ties with Israel complicates Russia’s currently critical relation with both.
Israel does not have anywhere near the immediate leverage over Russia. On the contrary, Israel benefits, especially long term, from cooperation with Russia to maintain its security interests in the region. What they do or did have is a genuine mutual respect and desire for good relations. This, especially for Russia in a time of war, has its limits. There is no compelling reason for her to endanger those to support Ukraine with military equipment.
As universal support for Ukraine wanes, there is also little sense in Israel caving to “US pressure” now, after resisting it for over a year.
Russia expands strategic assistance to Iran.
The problem with this one:
This rings more true. More significant military assistance to Iran could spur Israel to support Ukraine with advanced weapons in return. But this misses the point. Precisely one of the reasons that Russia is incentivized to not do so, is the Israeli response, which at the least could include military support for Ukraine. But the Biden cannot “pressure” Israel into making Russia sell advanced weapons to Iran. Nor can it hardly pressure Russia to.
So in fact this scenario describes one of the balancing factors in the region that keep Israel from not supplying Ukraine and not the reverse. For example, Israel caving into Scenario #1 would among other things, free Russia to supply Iran as it pleases and benefits her short term needs. The threat of Russia supplying Iran with advanced military technology is another reason why Israel will not (or at least should not) supply Ukraine with it, as opposed to a reason of why it would. The existence of #2, makes #1 less plausible, despite the order set in the document.
Israel expands outreach to the US for counter-Iran operations.
The problem here.
At face value, number 2 reads much like number 3. If Russia is helpful to Iran, Israel could want to (or be made to) supply Ukraine. Upon closer inspection, we can see that it is crudely disguised language for a US threat.
It is saying, if Russia does x and y (number 2), Israel might want our help to retaliate. So we have leverage on Israel to pressure her into helping the government in Kiev. At the end of the description, it drops the pretense of it being dependent on Russia doing something in the future, as it says “Israel has regularly requested ATG overflights to support strikes in Syria”. ATG here likely is referring to the US Al-Tanf military base in Syria (Al-Tanf Garrison).
The language is clear here, “It is already the case that they need us, we can already pressure them into supporting Ukraine”.
Let’s just say that this weak attempt by the Biden administration to pressure Netanyahu will have less chance of success now that that this document is out of the bag. The American public has enough true friends of Israel, that recognize the threat from Iran, to support an administration’s attempt to hijack that friendship to the benefit of Israel and America’s foes such as Iran, to buy even more unconditional and universal support for Zelensky’s Ukraine. It will not fly.
Expanded adversary Air Defense presence and Use in Syria.
What is this?
Number 4 is just a hope that Israel and Russia start shooting at each other in Syria, in which case Israel could be pressured to support Ukraine. It is surprising in its lack of scope or Ukraine-heavy tunnel vision. That a US administration would be pleased with hostilities between Israel and Russia exploding in Syria, with all the unknowable consequences of such, because it could mean a greater chance of getting some more Israeli weapons to Ukraine is nothing less short of extraordinary.
It makes one wonder if Ukraine really is the Democratic party’s private playground, and not the other way around. More sinisterly, we should wonder if #4 is only a hope, or within lies the seeds of a potential false flag operation. If anything, this revelation should encourage Jerusalem and Moscow to closer cooperation over Syria to avoid any lethal errors. Errors we now know, Washington is hoping for.
The document has likely proved interesting reading for Bibi Netanyahu.
There we have it. The two most interesting and consequential disclosures in the Pentagon Leaks… of what we have seen so far, more is likely to follow.
The way it was explained to me is that the military puts the day first because if the transmission is interrupted and only one number is transmitted, you want it to be the day number. Important information is usually about the short term, so if its an emergency message you can rule out it being about something nine months from now.